I. Introduction
Debates over "originalism" have been a central focus of contemporary constitutional theory for three decades. One of the features of this debate has been disagreement about what "originalism" is. More worrisome is the possibility that the arguments between contemporary originalists and their opponents, the "living constitutionalists", are confused -with each side of the debate making erroneous assumptions about the content of their opponent's theories.
The aim of this chapter is to clarify these debates by providing a history of contemporary originalism and then developing an account of the core or focal content of originalist theory. The history reveals that contemporary originalist theory has evolved -the mainstream of originalist theory began with an emphasis on the original intentions of the framers but has gradually moved to the view that the "original meaning" of the constitution is the "original public meaning" of the text. Even today, originalists disagree among themselves about a variety of important questions, including the normative justification for a constitutional practice that adheres to original meaning.
Despite evolution and continued disagreement, however, contemporary originalist theory has a core of agreement on two propositions. First, almost all originalists agree that the linguistic meaning of each constitutional provision was fixed at the time that provision was adopted. Second, originalists agree that our constitutional practice both is (albeit imperfectly) and should be committed to the principle that the original meaning of the Constitution constrains judicial practice. The question whether living constitutionalists actually disagree with these core principles of originalist theory is a complex one -to which we shall return at the end of this chapter.
II. A Word About the Word: The Origins of "Originalism"
The first appearance of the term "originalism" in Westlaw's database of legal periodicals is found in an article by Paul Brest in 1981, 1 but Brest had used both "originalism" and "originalist" in 1980 2 (in an article that is not included in the data base). So far as Brest knows, he coined the word. 3 Here is how Brest defined "originalism":
By "originalism" I mean the familiar approach to constitutional adjudication that accords binding authority to the text of the Constitution or the intentions of its adopters. 4
The disjunctive "or" in the last clause of Brest's definition presaged a debate among originalists, but what is most striking about this passage is
Brest's assumption that his audience already understood the features of the view that he was about to criticize. Brest's neologism caught on, and the words "originalism" and "originalist" appear frequently from 1981 onward. 5 4 Brest, "Misconceived Quest", supra note 2 at 204. 5 For example, a search on Google's Books Ngram Viewer reveals no use of the term before 1980 and a steady increase in use of the word "originalism" in books published after the early 1980s. See http://ngrams.googlelabs.com/graph?content=Originalism&year_start=1975&year_ end=2008&corpus=0&smoothing=3 (search for "originalism" from 1975 to 2008 in the "English" database on Google Books).
understanding," and "original intention"). Moreover, Brest used the terms "originalism" and "originalist" in order to refer to a position that he was criticizing. Brest's term caught on, and eventually was adopted by proponents of the views that had affinities with the object of his critique. As a consequence, the words "originalism" and "originalist" are ambiguous-used by scholars, lawyers, judges, and the public in a variety of different ways. It seems likely that as a matter of lexicography, "originalism" is a family resemblance term-with several overlapping senses.
This deep ambiguity in the meaning of originalism is further complicated by the sociology of the legal academy and the politics of judicial interpretation. Legal theorists who self-identify as originalists are likely to strive to police the boundaries of the "originalism," seeking to exclude implausible views and to focus debate on the versions of originalism that they believe are true, correct, or most reasonable. Legal theorists who oppose originalism may have precisely the opposite motivation, seeking to identify originalism with its least defensible variations. Political champions of originalism are likely to focus on simplified "sound bite" versions of the theory that conflate the content of originalist theory with the goals it seeks to achieve: "Originalism is the theory that judges should follow the law and not make it." Likewise, political opponents might define originalism as a view that is obviously unpalatable: "Originalism is anti-woman."
For all these reasons, the road to conceptual clarity in debates about originalism will be rocky. The quest for agreement on a single definition of originalism is likely to prove Quixotic. For this reason, stipulated definitions of originalism should be avoided. Readers of theoretical texts are imperfect, and the stipulated meaning of "originalism" is likely to be ignored or forgotten. A more promising approach should begin with the facts.
"Originalism" is an ambiguous theoretical term. There is a family of originalist constitutional theories. In order to make progress in the debates about "originalism," we will need to map the theoretical space, identifying the ways in which different versions of originalism vary and the ways in which they resemble one another.
III. A Very Short History of Contemporary Originalist Theory
The first step towards an answer to the question, "What is originalism?," was an investigation of the origins of the word "originalism." The second step is a history of the theories that are associated with that word. The history that is offered here is necessarily brief, partial, and incomplete. A complete version of the story would require a long monograph. loosely "originalist" in the contemporary senses of that term. The following passage is representative:
There appear to be two proper methods of deriving rights from the Constitution. The first is to take from the document rather specific values that text or history show the framers actually to have intended and which are capable of being translated into principled rules. We may call these specified rights. The second method derives rights from governmental processes established by the Constitution. These are secondary or derived individual rights. This latter category is extraordinarily important. This method of derivation is essential to the interpretation of the first amendment, to voting rights, to criminal procedure and to much else. 18
The emphasis on "text" and "history" is recognizably originalist, but
Bork's notion of "derived rights" is not clearly anchored in original meaning or original intentions. In reviewing a term of the Court, it is important to take a moment and reflect upon the proper role of the Supreme Court in our constitutional system. The intended role of the judiciary generally and the Supreme Court in particular was to serve as the "bulwarks of a limited constitution." The judges, the Founders believed, would not fail to regard the Constitution as "fundamental law" and would "regulate their decisions" by it. As the "faithful guardians of the Constitution," the judges were expected to resist any political effort to depart from the literal provisions of the Constitution. intentions of the ratifiers -either the state ratifying conventions understood as corporate bodies or of the individuals who attended the ratifying conventions and voted in favor of ratification. 38 We need not tarry long over this twist in the debate. The move to ratifiers' understanding or intent is best understood in conjunction with popular sovereignty as a justification for originalism. The ratifiers, rather than the Framers, could plausibly be viewed as expressing the political will of "We the People." However, all of the problems that attended the equation of constitutional meaning with Framers' intent seem to attach to ratifiers' intent.
Moreover, evidence may be even more difficult to obtain 39 and the problems of group intention -of multiple conventions with multiple members -even more confounding with respect to ratifiers' intent. To the extent that the ratifiers' understanding is rooted in the public meaning, the emphasis on ratifiers is merely a way station on the journey from original intentions to "periods" -act more democratically than do legislators, who serve special interests and escape the people's attention during the extended periods of ordinary politics.
As developed in the Storrs Lectures, Ackerman's theory focused on three constitutional moments: the Founding (the Constitution of 1789),
Reconstruction (the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments), and the New Deal. Here is the initial appearance of that idea in the lectures:
Speaking schematically, this historical story is dominated by three peaks of high importance that tower over valleys full of more particular meanings. The first peak, of course, is the Founding itself: the framing of the original Constitution and the Bill of Rights, Marbury v. Madison and McCulloch v. Maryland. The second peak is constituted by the legal events surrounding the Civil War: the judicial failure in Dred Scott and the constitutional affirmations of the Civil War Amendments. The third peak centers around the legitimation of the activist welfare state: the long Progressive struggle against judicial resistance and the dramatic capitulation by the Old Court before the New Deal in 1937. Time and again, we return to these moments; the lessons we learn from them control the meanings we give to our present constitutional predicaments. 44 Because Ackerman's theory purported to legitimize progressive New Deal constitutionalism, his view might have been construed as the polar opposite of originalism, but at a deep level, Ackerman's theory seemed to require an account of original meaning. Without employing original meaning, judicial enforcement of the Constitution could not be legitimized by democratic constitutional politics. In other words, a theory of original meaning is required for constitutional content to be determined by "We the
People."
Ackerman's development of popular sovereignty theory has been extraordinarily influential, and others have contributed important work in this vein, 45 prominently Akhil Reed Amar, 46 Ackerman's colleague at Yale Law School. Cass Sunstein has described Amar's position in the following terms:
[I]n the law schools the most influential originalist may be Akhil Reed Amar, an ingenious and prolific scholar at Yale Law School. Describing himself as a "textualist" who is interested in history, Amar is methodologically quite close to Scalia. He is intensely interested in the text and in the historical record, and he is generally searching for the original meaning of contested terms. Amar wishes to know what the Constitution "really means," and he puts that question as if it were largely or entirely a matter of excavation. 47 )). 48 Thus, it is no accident that Amar and Ackerman's students describe themselves as originalists. See, e.g., Lash, "A Textual-Historical Theory", supra note 45 at 900 ("I will consider the historical record and attempt to identify which of the possible textual meanings are more or less plausible, given historical evidence of original public understanding. In this way, I hope to provide an account of the Ninth Amendment satisfactory in terms of both originalism and textualism.").
E. Original public meaning and the new originalism
This sets the stage for what is sometimes called "the New Originalism" 49 For the purposes of this very brief survey, perhaps their most important move is to embrace the distinction between "constitutional interpretation," understood as the enterprise of discerning the semantic content of the Constitution, and "constitutional construction," which we might tentatively define as the activity of determining the legal effect of the constitutional text.
One mode of construction involves judicial specification of constitutional doctrine when the text is vague, but construction can take place in the political branches as well. 56 Meaning" 58 and "Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption". 59 In these essays, Balkin argued for a reconciliation of original-meaning originalism with living constitutionalism according to a theory that might be called "the method of text and principle." The meaning of the "text" provides a constraining framework within which constitutional "principles" operate.
One understanding of Balkin's view is that the "text" requires interpretation and the "principles" are matters of constitutional construction.
Predating much of the American work on the New Originalism was Balkin sees the same issue, but concludes that originalism is strengthened by excluding "original expected applications." 63 The distinction is a simple one. The linguistic meaning of a text is one thing, and expectations about the application of that meaning to future cases are a different thing. Balkin makes use of the distinction to argue that some originalists have conflated meaning with expected applications:
Originalists generally assume that if we do not apply the constitutional text in the way it was originally understood at the time of its adoption we are not following what the words mean and so will not be faithful to the Constitution as law. But they have tended to conflate two different ideas -the expected application of constitutional texts, which is not binding law, and the original meaning, which is. Indeed, many originalists who claim to be interested only in original meaning, like Justice Antonin Scalia, have encouraged this conflation of original meaning and original expected application in their practices of argument. 64 The fact that original expected applications are distinct from original meanings should not imply that the two are unrelated. Expected applications of a text may offer evidence about its meanings, even if these applications are neither decisive evidence of meaning nor meaning itself.
Of course, some originalists may contest Balkin's move and argue that original expectations originalism is viable. The justification could be that reliance on original expectations is the distinctive characteristic that marks originalist theories as originalist. 65 But this view appears incorrect given the history of originalist thought, and it is certainly contrary to the theories of Despite large apparent differences between originalism and nonoriginalist theories, originalist and nonoriginalist judges converge in their decisions surprisingly often. Given the strident debates among constitutional theorists, one well might wonder how so much agreement could eventuate. The reason, I would suggest, is that what we call constitutional theories or theories of constitutional interpretation are often theories about constitutional meaning that implicitly accept the permissibility of a disparity between constitutional meaning and implementing doctrine. If constitutional theories fix the meaning of the Constitution, but stipulate that implementing doctrines sometimes permissibly diverge from it, then such theories are less complete and thus less practically significant than their proponents suggest. 70 Fallon's distinction between the semantic content of the Constitution and the legal content of constitutional law put the following question of 68 To the extent that McGinnis and Rappaport believe that original methods recover the linguistic meaning or semantic content of the constitutional text, their theory faces severe obstacles. The public linguistic meaning of a text cannot be the legal construction that is placed upon that text by legal interpreters. Legal methods operate on the semantic content fixed by linguistic meaning: they do not create it. To think otherwise is to confuse meaning in the semantic sense with meaning in the applicative sense. 73 The distinction is never discussed in a theoretical way. The first mention appears on page 34 of his essay. Ibid. at 1217. 74 Ibid. at 1196-1205. 75 No variant of the root word "semantic" appears in Griffin's article. Although the term "meaning" and its variants appear numerous times, there is no indication that Griffin appreciates the possibility that originalism might be a semantic theory.
A second new critic is Mitchell Berman, whose critique of originalism is tendentiously titled "Originalism is Bunk". 76 Berman's essay is deep and rich, raising some old objections to originalism, providing new foundations for others, and developing new positions. One of the crucial moves in his piece is his argument that the term "Originalism" (when capitalized) should be reserved for the strong claim that original meaning, whatever that might be, should trump other considerations in constitutional practice. He summarizes this claim as follows:
Originalism proper is strong originalism-the thesis that original meaning either is the only proper target of judicial constitutional interpretation or that it has at least lexical priority over any other candidate meanings the text might bear (again, contrary judicial precedents possibly excepted).
[FN49] It entails (but is not equivalent to) the thesis that nothing that transpires after ratification of a particular constitutional provision, save a subsequent constitutional amendment, has operative (as opposed to evidential) bearing on what courts ought to identify as constitutional meaning. In fact, just as with nonoriginalism, there is profound internal disagreement on the originalist side of the line. A review of originalists' work reveals originalism to be not a single, coherent, unified theory of constitutional interpretation, but rather a smorgasbord of distinct constitutional theories that share little in common except a misleading reliance on a single label. 83 The question that Smith and Colby raise is an important one, and we shall return to it in Part IV of this chapter.
H. District of Columbia v. Heller & McDonald v. City of Chicago
Supreme Court decisions that squarely address the fundamental issues of constitutional theory are rare, but District of Columbia v. Heller 84 is such a decision. The key passage in the majority opinion is unmistakably originalist:
In interpreting this text, we are guided by the principle that '[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning. 85 The implications of the majority's conclusion that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess and carry weapons were purposes that animated the Second Amendment and raising a number of arguments relevant to the original intentions of the Framers. 86 The majority opinion in Heller covers a good deal of territory, much of it contested by the dissents, but, for the purpose of completing this brief survey of the contemporary development of originalist theory, the important feature of Heller is methodological. The Court examined each of the operative words and phrases in the Second Amendment, examining the semantic content of "the people," "keep," "bear," and "arms." The Court concluded its examination as follows: "Putting all of these textual elements together, we find that they guarantee the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation." 87 In examining each of the operative words and phrases, the Court examined evidence of usage from the period the Second Amendment was proposed and ratified. For example:
Before addressing the verbs "keep" and "bear," we interpret their object: "Arms." The 18th-century meaning is no different from the meaning today. The 1773 edition of Samuel Johnson's dictionary defined "arms" as "weapons of offence, or armour of defence." Timothy Cunningham's important 1771 legal dictionary defined "arms" as "any thing that a man wears for his defence, or takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or strike another." 88 Another example:
The phrase "keep arms" was not prevalent in the written documents of the founding period that we have found, but there are a few examples, all of which favor viewing the right to "keep Arms" as an individual right unconnected with militia service. William Blackstone, for example, wrote that Catholics convicted of not attending service in the Church of England suffered certain penalties, one of which was that they were not permitted to "keep arms in their houses." 89 Additionally: 86 See, e.g., ibid. at 2837 n.28 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 87 Ibid. at 2797 (majority opinion). for any doctrine that would legitimate unenumerated rights.
IV. What is Originalism?
The question "What is originalism?," is itself ambiguous? One version of the question asks, "What is the meaning of the word "originalism?" The answer to that question is that the word is now ambiguous -having several different related senses in both scholarly and popular discourse. A second version of the questions is, "What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for content of a constitutional theory to qualify as 'originalist'?" That question should be taken off the table of serious scholarly inquiry. Originalism is not a natural kind; the term "originalism" is not used to point to the single true and correct version of originalist theory. It is simply not the case that the theories that we Does the fact that originalism is a family of theories that cannot be explicated via a series of necessary and sufficient conditions entail the further conclusion that the question, "What is originalism?," should be abandoned altogether? Before we answer that question in the affirmative, we could consider the possibility that the family of originalist theories can be described systematically. We may be able to develop a systematic account of the similarities and differences among the varieties of originalism, and that account might allow us to identify themes or core ideas that most (if not all) originalists share. This pattern of agreement suggests that most or almost all originalists agree that original meaning was fixed or determined at the time each provision of the constitution was framed and ratified. We might call this idea the fixation thesis. It is no surprise that originalists agree on the fixation thesis. The term "originalism" was coined to describe a family of textualist and intentionalist approaches to constitutional interpretation and construction that were associated with phrases like "original intentions," "original meaning," and "original understanding." These phrases and the word "originalist" share the root word "origin." The idea that meaning is fixed at the time of origination for each constitutional provision serves as the common denominator for all off these expressions. Thus, the fixation thesis might be described as a core idea, around which all or almost all originalist theories organize themselves.
Almost all originalist theories are theories of constitutional practicethey have something to say about how officials (especially judges and paradigmatically Justices of the United States Supreme Court) should interpret and construe the Constitution. Although it would be theoretically possible for an originalist theory to limit itself to the purely linguistic claim that the semantic content of the Constitution is fixed at the time of origin of each provision, almost all self-identified originalists make further claims about the implications of that fact for constitutional practice.
The variations among originalists in this second dimension can be clarified by marking a distinction between semantic content and legal content.
The semantic content of the constitutional text is the linguistic meaning of the document. But the term "meaning" is itself ambiguous. The constitutional text has a linguistic meaning, but that meaning is distinct from the legal implications of the text. Because we sometimes use the word "meaning" to describe such implications, the "meaning of the Constitution" can refer to set of legal rules (the body of constitutional doctrine) that mediates between the text and the decision of particular cases. The legal content of the constitutional doctrine is simply the set or rules developed by courts (and other officials) for the application of the text to particular cases.
Although originalists agree that the semantic content of the Constitution was fixed at the time each provision was framed and ratified, they disagree about the role that semantic content plays in determining legal content. In Originalists differ in yet another important respect. Different versions of originalist theory provide different justifications for the constraining force of original meaning. Some originalists emphasize the rule of law. Others focus on the idea of popular sovereignty. Yet others emphasize the notion that the conventions of legal practice do not permit judges to deliberately overrule the linguistic meaning of the constitutional text. And still others may make the claim that adherence to original meaning is justified because it will produce better decisions in the long run than the alternative methods of constitutional interpretation and construction. It seems likely that many originalists will rely on some combination of these arguments, and others as well.
Of course these variations in the justifications for originalism are important, but the existence of variations at the level of normative foundation is to be expected, given the pluralism that characterizes the public culture of the American polity in general and the academy in particular. Disagreement at the level of ultimate normative foundations is perfectly consistent with agreement on core originalist principles as an operative judicial philosophy.
What is originalism? Within the domain of constitutional theory, originalism is a family of views that cluster around two central ideas, the fixation thesis and the contribution thesis. All or almost all originalists agree that the original meaning of the Constitution was fixed at the time each provision was framed and ratified. Almost all originalists agree that original meaning must make an important contribution to the content of constitutional doctrine: most originalists agree that courts should view themselves as constrained by original meaning and that very good reasons are required for legitimate departures from that constraint.
What then should we make of Colby and Smith's claim that originalism is "a smorgasbord of distinct constitutional theories that share little in common except a misleading reliance on a single label"? 96 Colby and Smith are certainly correct that the term "originalism" is not used to describe a single theoretical position characterized by strong agreement among its proponents on all the important constituent elements. But this does not entail the conclusion that the only thing that unifies most (or even almost all) 96 Colby & Smith, "Living Originalism", supra note 82 at 244. originalist theories is "misleading reliance on a single label." The two ideas that provide the focal point of agreement among almost all originalist theories, the fixation thesis and the contribution thesis, are directly and transparently related to the label, "originalism," and the cognate notions of "original meaning" or "original understanding." Originalists agree that the "meaning" (the semantic content or linguistic meaning) of the constitutional text was fixed at the time that each provision of the constitution was framed and ratified. The fixation thesis expresses the idea that the "origin" or "time of origination" of each constitutional provision fix its meaning, which originalists call the "original meaning." There is nothing misleading about the use of the term "originalism" as the label for this view. Moreover, the family of originalist theories is organized around another central idea, the fixation thesis and its strong variant, the constraint principle. Almost all originalists agree that the original meaning ought to make a substantial and important contribution to constitutional doctrine, and most originalists make the stronger claim that this contribution ought to constrain constitutional doctrine (absent very good reasons for departure from the original meaning).
What about the important differences that remain? Does the fact that originalists disagree about important matters somehow ground an argument against the validity of the best versions of originalist theory? Initially, it is difficult to see how this argument might go. Colby and Smith are certainly correct to the extent that they argue that originalism cannot claim strong theoretical unity as a virtue -to the extent that originalists have made that claim they are simply incorrect. Originalism is a family of theories that cluster around the fixation thesis and the contribution thesis -not a single theory whose proponents agree on all the important details.
But from the fact that originalists almost all agree about two core ideas but disagree about much else, it does not follow that no version of originalism is correct. Consider the analogous situation that holds in the natural sciences.
Suppose that at one stage in the development of the theory of evolution, there were competing accounts of the mechanism by which natural selection actually occurred. (Until the discovery of DNA, the actual mechanism was uncertain.) From this fact, it would surely not follow that no version of the theory of evolution could be true or that competing versions of the theory were united only by a "misleading label." The more sensible response to theoretical disagreement is to ask the question, "Which version of the theory is right, correct, or best?" The argument that evolution must be wrong because evolutionary biologists disagree about important questions is simply a subtle variation on the genetic fallacy (no pun intended).
The originalist family of theories is actually relatively immature as academic theories go. One might read the progression from original intentions of the framers to the understandings of the ratifiers to the original public meaning of the text as a story of increasing fracture and degeneration, but the same narrative may eventually come to be seen as a story of progress and increasing sophistication.
Perhaps the most worrisome and most persistent disagreement among originalists is the one tacitly identified by Brest when he coined the term "originalism" -originalists continue to disagree about the role of "original intentions" and "original public meaning." Colby and Smith emphasize this worry: [O] riginalists' specific claims that their approach alone properly treats the Constitution as a form of law and properly limits the judiciary to its appropriate role in a democratic society . . . start from the premise that originalism (and only originalism) treats the Constitution as having a fixed and determinate meaning. Yet the meaning that a committed originalist judge would find obviously turns on the particular brand of originalism that the judge applies. And over the last thirty-five years, that meaning has been anything but fixed. A judge committed to the originalist enterprise would once have invoked original intent, and would today have the freedom to choose from a smorgasbord that includes original intent and many other originalist approaches. 97 Colby and Smith exaggerate to the extent that they claim that theoretical divergence among originalists would give judges discretion to pick and choose among originalist theories -each judge would be bound across cases to employ the theory she believed was correct, but the essence of their point is correct: there are real and substantial differences between the competing versions of originalist theory.
But the importance of the disagreement between intentionalist and public-meaning originalists should not be exaggerated. The form of intentionalism that has emerged in recent years emphasizes the semantic intentions of the authors of the constitutional text -best understood as a complex combination of the framers and ratifiers. The view is that the linguistic meaning of the text is a function of the intentions (or mental states) of its authors. Public meaning originalism takes the view that the linguistic meaning of the constitutional text is a function of its conventional semantic meaning -which is determined by patterns of usage among the relevant linguistic community.
It is possible for intended meaning and public meaning to diverge, but in the case of a legal text, such divergence will be rare in practice. The authors of the constitutional text knew that those who would read and interpret the text would have limited access to information about idiosyncratic semantic intentions: for example, the records of the Philadelphia convention and the ratifying conventions were not publicly available in the era that immediately followed ratification. For this reason, the semantic intentions of the ratifiers are likely to closely track original public meaning -a point that is recognized by sophisticated originalists of both the intentionalist and publicmeaning varieties. And it is no surprise that this divide in originalist theory is accompanied by agreement (in principle) in application. Originalist theory must account for linguistic facts on the ground -and this means that such theories must converge in order to adequately account for the relevant evidence.
V. Originalism and Living Constitutionalism
The chief aim of this chapter is a modest one, to lay a foundation that can help to clarify and sharpen debates about originalist constitutional theory. The strategy has been to address the question, "What is originalism?," in the context of the evolution or development of originalist theory. In this penultimate section of the chapter, these efforts will be applied to the debate between originalists and living constitutionalists.
The first and perhaps the most important point is that it misleading to characterize controversies between originalists and living constitutionalists as a single debate. There are several versions of originalism, and it seems likely that there are many versions of "living constitutionalism." The first best approach to that fact would involve an investigation of "living constitutionalism" that parallels the exploration of originalism undertaken in this chapter, but on this occasion, we must settle for the second best approach by relying on a representative example of living constitutionalism as a starting point. Justice William Brennan of the United States Supreme Court offered an influential formulation of living constitutionalism:
To remain faithful to the content of the Constitution, therefore, an approach to interpreting the text must account for the existence of the substantive value choices and must accept the ambiguity inherent in the effort to apply them to modern circumstances. The Framers discerned fundamental principles through struggles against particular malefactions of the Crown: the struggle shapes the particular contours of the articulated principles. But our acceptance of the fundamental principles has not and should not bind us to those precise, at times anachronistic, contours. 98
Brennan's formulation allows us to identify two ideas that are associated with living constitutionalism. The first idea is that constitutional principles must be adapted to changing circumstances. The freedoms of speech and of the press at the time of the framing and ratification of the First The compatibilist story about the relationship between living constitutionalism and originalism can be articulated via the distinction between constitutional interpretation and constitutional construction that is associated with the New Originalism. Compatibilism could be the view that originalism and living constitutionalism have separate domains. Originalism has constitutional interpretation as its domain: the linguistic meaning of the Constitution is fixed. Living constitutionalism has constitutional construction as its domain: the vague provisions of the constitution can be given constructions that change over time in order to adapt to changing values and circumstances. A fully specified living constitutionalism would have to provide a theory of constitutional construction that satisfies this description, and we can imagine that there could be a variety of such theories.
If living constitutionalism accepts the fixation thesis, some theory of semantic content, and some version of the contribution thesis, then living constitutionalism is committed to the idea that the constitutional text provides constitutional law a hard core. Originalists and some living constitutionalists could agree that the hard core of determinant constitutional meaning should not yield to changing circumstances and values and agree that in the "construction zone" created by the abstract, vague, and general provisions of the text, constitutional doctrine can "live" and "grow" in response to changing circumstances and values.
But some living constitutionalist may deny that there is a hard core.
They might believe that even the core of constitutional law is malleable and subject to manipulation. That is, they might assert that the living constitution has a soft core. What then about incompatibilism?
There are at least two different ways in which living constitutionalism could make assertions that are inconsistent with originalism. One possibility is that living constitutionalism is a theory of linguistic meaning. That is, living constitutionalists could be understood as denying the fixation thesis and asserting that the semantic meaning of a given constitutional provision was offered to illustrate the importance of clarity in these debates. If we begin with the assumption that originalism must be incompatible with living constitutionalism, that assumption may well obscure the most important issues. Originalists and living constitutionalists may find common ground on very issues that they believe are the heart of the controversy. Once these misconceptions are cleared away, the new ground for contestation may look a bit different and new issues may take center stage.
VI. Conclusion
One of the goals of this chapter has been to motivate a reorientation of the debates about originalism in constitutional theory. Constitutional theory can be practiced as politics by other means. Originalism can be viewed as the "conservative" theory, and living constitutionalism as the "liberal theory," but that picture is oversimplified at best. There is an alternative to the politicization of constitutional theory. Originalism and living constitutionalism can be debated on the intellectual merits, but that will only occur if participants in the debates view these theories in their best light and apply the principle of charity to the arguments of their opponents.
"Originalism" is an ambiguous term. The family of contemporary originalist constitutional theories contains substantial diversity, and there may be no single thesis upon which all self-described originalists agree. Despite the variety of originalist theories, there are two central ideas that serve as the focal point or core of contemporary originalism. Almost all originalists agree that the original meaning of the Constitution was fixed at the time each provision was framed and ratified. Most originalists agree that the original meaning of the Constitution should strongly constrain the content of constitutional doctrine.
